















How Libraries Could 
Help Us with Scholarly 
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Universities easily fall into ruts. Almost every 
epoch requires a fresh start.
—Daniel Coit Gilman
Inaugural Address as First President of 
Johns Hopkins University
Research has become the dominant source 
of instinct, meaning, status and revenue in 
higher education, especially at the top of the 
university totem pole.
—Simon Marginson
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 44  CHAPTER 2
Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the 
authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and 
reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.
—Jean-François Lyotard
The Postmodern Condition: 
A Report on Knowledge
We scholars1 value scholarly publication above all else. Since the library can 
help us with research—mostly by providing access to the scholarly literature 
we need—we also value the library. However, we scholars are not, as a group, 
convinced that librarians really understand the value of research. Yes, li-
brarians understand things like cataloging and preservation, but even when 
librarians are technically considered members of the faculty, we scholars 
presume that libraries and librarians are there to serve our research needs.
Put differently, for us scholars, where scholarly publication has 
intrinsic value, the library and librarians have instrumental value. It goes 
without saying for us scholars that whatever has intrinsic value (such as 
research) and is valued for its own sake is inherently more valuable than 
anything that has merely instrumental value (such as the library) and can 
be seen as a means to another end. This attitude, which Nietzsche would 
have termed the order of rank of our scholarly values, is literally ancient—
it was clearly expressed by Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics (written 
~350 BCE). We scholars have institutionalized this attitude in the form of 
the university.
As we shall see, this attitude has several implications for libraries as 
publishers. One such implication is that we scholars tend not to work in a 
collaborative manner with libraries and librarians; instead, we expect not to 
encounter any resistance from them (a book should always be on the shelf, 
we should have easy access to all the journal articles we need, and so forth). 
We may in fact resent it when libraries try to move beyond this minimal 
role. For instance, if libraries really understood scholarly publishing, they 
would not do things like impose open-access mandates.
1. Throughout this chapter, I include myself in the set “we scholars” in con-
trast to librarians, a group of which I am certainly not a member. Whether 
I really ought to be included among “we scholars” will, I hope, remain 
unclear. For the sake of argument, however, I definitely mean to exclude 
librarians from that group and to treat librarians and scholars as separate 
entities with different values.
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So the idea that libraries might themselves enter into the publishing 
arena strikes many academics as silly at best.2 At worst, depending on how 
it is implemented, many academics will see library publishing as a threat to 
academic freedom. This chapter attempts to reconstruct how we scholars 
think about these matters in an effort to help libraries that are venturing 
out into the world of scholarly publishing. It also attempts to construct 
an argument that we scholars ought to adjust our own thinking about the 
library, as well as about scholarly publishing.
On (Academic) Liberty
The university is founded on freedom. At the same time, the university in-
stantiates many ideas of freedom. Although I agree that it is important for 
librarians to understand the difference between the sorts of academic free-
dom we scholars enjoy and the intellectual freedom accorded to librarians 
(see Danner and Bintliff 2007 for an excellent account of this distinction), 
these are not the different sorts of freedom I plan to address here. Instead, 
I shall begin with an examination of the philosophical issues that under-
lie several different understandings of freedom operative in the university 
where “the university” is understood to embody many different contexts. 
These different understandings—which are usually implicit—provide am-
ple opportunity for miscommunication among us scholars, between us 
scholars and university administrators, and between us scholars and librar-
ians. Until we begin to understand—and perhaps to reconceive—academic 
freedom, libraries have little chance to succeed as scholarly publishers.
Academic freedom itself varies from context to context. Different 
countries, and even different universities within the same country, have 
different views of academic freedom. This fact is fairly well known and 
is very well discussed in the literature on academic freedom. Less well 
discussed, however, at least outside of the circle of academic philosophy, 
is the question of whether we have different ideas of freedom itself. This 
2. I am aware that some libraries have been engaged with publishing for 
some time; but I believe I am in the minority and that most scholars remain 
ignorant of this fact. I spend more time than most scholars engaging with 
librarians, and I was surprised to learn while writing this chapter that there 
had once existed an International Group of Publishing Libraries.
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chapter is not the place to go into detail about this philosophical debate. 
However, a brief tour of some of the issues—something no scholar of 
philosophy would respect as true scholarship—will prove enlightening.
Isaiah Berlin (1958) distinguished between two concepts of liberty: 
negative liberty, which can be summarized as freedom from constraint, 
and positive liberty, which can be summarized as freedom to pursue a self-
determined course of action. Although Berlin’s account was specifically 
about liberty in a political context, these two concepts of liberty are also 
relevant to the sort of freedom we scholars understand when we think of 
academic freedom. Indeed, the history of the notion of academic freedom 
suggests that we scholars have moved away from thinking of academic 
freedom as positive liberty and toward a notion of academic freedom as 
negative liberty. The most obvious evidence of this shift is the evolution of 
our attitudes toward tenure.
Tenure—From Means to End
Tenure is meant to be a means to secure the end of academic freedom. In 
fact, however, tenure has become the end we seek, and academics have 
become so beholden to the idea of tenure that we sacrifice the pursuit of 
positive freedom. Instead of what Fuller (1999) describes as the “right to be 
wrong,” we scholars assert the “right to be right—or at least to avoid being 
wrong—in our own little world.”
The idea that tenure is meant to be a means to secure academic 
freedom is explicitly and clearly expressed in the American Association of 
University Professors’ (AAUP) 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure:
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) free-
dom of teaching and research and of extramural activ-
ities, and (2) a sufficient degree of economic security 
to make the profession attractive to men and women 
of ability. Freedom and economic security, hence, ten-
ure, are indispensable to the success of an institution in 
fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society. 
(AAUP 1990, 3)
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As competition for tenured academic jobs has increased over the 
years, tenure has increasingly been identified with the end of economic 
security. Those lucky enough to secure a tenure-track position these days 
are typically advised to “do what it takes” to be granted tenure. “What 
it takes” is typically expressed in terms of a set of criteria for tenure, 
including especially publishing a certain amount of scholarship (a number 
of articles or a book) in certain venues (top journals or academic presses). 
The first seven years or so of a scholar’s career are thus spent with one 
aim in mind: securing tenure. Moreover, scholars are trained to adhere to 
strict disciplinary standards of what counts in order to achieve the end of 
tenure. The idea that tenure is meant as a means to freedom of teaching and 
research has dropped out, replaced by the idea that tenure equals economic 
security, provided one follows the rules.
Once tenure has been granted, scholars do view themselves as free—
free from the overwhelming pressure to publish or perish. Once tenure has 
been granted, the scholar is safe. Provided that minimal standards are met, 
the tenured scholar is generally permitted to go about her or his business 
of teaching and research without too many external constraints. Academic 
freedom has been effectively reduced to the idea of negative liberty.
Insofar as we scholars tend to view tenure as the end and scholarship as 
the chief means to that end, we also tend to undervalue the positive aspects 
of academic freedom. We scholars care not what we are free to do, but only 
what we are free from being required to do. (This insight, by the way, should 
be an important lesson for those in charge of assessing scholarly research.) 
That scholars tend to undervalue the positive aspects of academic freedom 
has important ramifications for the course of scholarship. Nowhere is this 
fact more evident than in the process of peer review.
Our Twisted View of Peer Review
According to Biagioli (2002), peer review was originally used as a com-
plement to state censorship—foreign products were censored, while those 
produced within the state under the auspices of national academies were 
subject to “internal,” that is, intrastate, peer review. The notion of an inter-
nal peer gradually moved away from the state, shifting the locus of power 
to academic disciplines. Today, particularly in terms of the scientific com-
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munity, peer review is treated as a guarantee of epistemic warrant, as well 
as viewed as another means of securing academic freedom. However, the 
sort of academic freedom peer review secures is negative—peer review 
erects a barrier against outside, nonacademic interference. What is lacking 
is any sense that peer review could also be used to expand our positive 
freedom (Holbrook 2010). We seek assurance from our peers that what we 
say is right, or at least not wrong, rather than insurance from peer review 
to take intellectual and academic risks.
Disciplines define peers, and peer review is generally designed to 
uphold disciplinary standards—of rigor, of method, of subject matter, 
and generally of what counts as good research within a discipline. When 
a piece of research is subject to peer review, then, it typically means that 
disciplinary standards will determine whether it passes muster to be 
published (in the case of a manuscript submitted for publication) or to be 
funded (in the case of a grant proposal). Decisions regarding promotion 
and tenure typically involve a larger body of work, but this work is also 
typically subject first and foremost to disciplinary peer review (by peers 
within the department and external referees, who are typically scholars of 
high standing within the discipline). Tenure decisions usually also involve 
review by members of the faculty from disciplines other than that of the 
person up for tenure review. These tenure review committees tend to rely 
heavily on the reports of the disciplinary peers within the department 
and the external disciplinary reviews. The largest factor in their decisions, 
however, remains the candidate’s record of peer-reviewed publications 
(National Research Council 2012; Harley 2013). Such publications ideally 
appear in the top journals within the researcher’s field of expertise. In 
other words, nondisciplinary “peers” place their trust in the judgment of 
disciplinary peers.
This sort of respect shown by members of review panels for the 
disciplinary expertise of other reviewers is also sometimes evident in the 
peer review of grant proposals. Lamont, Mallard, and Guetzkow (2012) 
identify several “rules” adopted by panelists, including “deferring to 
expertise” and “respecting disciplinary sovereignty” (431). Peer review, 
then, whether of manuscripts or grant proposals, is typically dependent 
on disciplinary norms. As such, peer review is typically conservative, 
encouraging adherence to normal rather than “potentially transformative” 
research (Frodeman and Holbrook 2012).
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Although tenure depends on peer review, the conservatism of peer 
review is reinforced by the need to secure tenure. Scholars seeking tenure 
are warned against—since they are typically not rewarded for—publishing 
in lower quality (according to peers) venues, much less in venues outside 
their native disciplines. The combined forces of peer review and tenure 
requirements pose the greatest threat to the emergence of libraries as 
publishers.
On (Academic) Libraries
I see an ongoing effort aimed at re-envisioning the academic library. The 
source of this effort is, as far as I can tell, internal to libraries themselves. 
Libraries face a slew of problems. Most pressing, perhaps, are issues regard-
ing space and increasing strains on library budgets. Technology promises 
some help for issues of space. Digitized collections, after all, take up less 
physical space than books. But technology may also help ease the strain on 
library budgets—or so the thinking goes.
As far as I can tell, forward-thinking librarians, many of whom 
have training in information science as well as in library science, see an 
opportunity in the advance of information technology. This opportunity is 
linked to the increase in subscription prices for scholarly journals, including 
the practice of many scholarly publishers of bundling journals together. 
Why, these forward-thinking librarians wonder, should subscription prices 
for journals go up while the price for publishing them, because of advances 
in information technology, continues to go down? Armed with knowledge 
of both the economics and technology of publishing, librarians have begun 
to think in terms of business models.
The open-access (OA) movement also seems to be linked with this 
new way of thinking. Opening access to scholarship is good, philosophically 
speaking, especially from a librarian’s (or a research funder’s) point of view. 
Technologically, OA is viable. As a business model for scholarly publishing—
or rather, for scholarly publishers—however, OA presents many difficulties. 
Scholarly publishers have generally balked at OA, though the combination of 
funder mandates, new OA journals, and increasing pressure from librarians 
has led to some publishers at least appearing to move in the direction of OA 
(though one suspects a movement akin to “greenwashing” businesses).
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Sensing an opportunity, libraries have begun to promote OA 
policies at an increasing number of universities. Faculty senates across the 
land have been convinced that such policies are good for scholarship—
we scholars certainly want our research to be more readily available, 
perhaps even more read and more cited! We also love it if we can simply 
and easily access others’ research without having to navigate pay walls or 
sign in to our library website, only to find that our library has dropped 
a subscription (it was too costly, after all, given that it was bundled with 
little used journals) to a journal that contains an article we need to write 
the next sentence! OA seems a win-win-win for libraries, for research 
funders, and for us scholars. If OA undermines the current business 
model of today’s scholarly publishers, well, so much the better! Libraries 
can act as publishers to fill the void left when today’s giants of scholarly 
publishing collapse.
This sort of enthusiasm is infectious, of course. In fact, one can make 
a case that something like infectious enthusiasm is a necessary requirement 
for any revolution to succeed. But for all its promise, OA should also be 
seen as an opportunity for libraries to learn some lessons. The simplest and 
biggest lesson of OA is that librarians do not yet understand us scholars 
and our scholarly culture. This misunderstanding is demonstrated by the 
fact that many OA policies mandate that scholarly work (starting with 
peer-reviewed journal articles) be submitted to an institutional repository.
Lessons to be Learned from Open-Access 
Mandates
The first lesson to be learned from OA mandates is the extent to which we 
scholars value our academic freedom—specifically in the sense of nega-
tive liberty or freedom from constraints. To mandate that we upload some 
version of our scholarly work to an institutional repository—no matter 
how easy libraries make that task—automatically places an additional con-
straint on us scholars. Insofar as mandates place additional constraints on 
us, they by definition limit our negative liberty.
The second lesson to be learned from OA mandates is that we 
scholars tend to see our academic freedom in disciplinary terms. Even if 
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we scholars (in the form of a faculty senate, say) voted in favor of an OA 
mandate, which seems to respect our academic freedom, OA mandates 
can be seen as a threat to our academic freedom insofar as they fail to 
respect disciplinary sovereignty. Historians, to take one example, tend to 
resist OA mandates that apply to dissertations. A historian’s dissertation 
typically becomes that historian’s first book. Making the dissertation openly 
available automatically makes the historian’s research openly available. 
This openness poses two threats to the historian’s disciplinary sovereignty. 
First, many historians are concerned that an openly available dissertation 
will be viewed by book publishers as prior publication, thus making the 
prospects of securing a book contract more difficult. Second, once the 
research is made openly available, other historians who are working on 
similar areas may come in and “scoop” the research, including it in their 
own book already under contract. A footnote in someone else’s book does 
not equate to one’s own book, and if the research is already published in 
someone else’s book, that, too, would undermine one’s efforts to secure a 
book contract.
The third lesson to be learned from OA mandates is that it is 
sometimes possible—and sometimes even efficacious—to appeal to a 
notion of academic freedom in the sense of positive liberty. That faculty at 
many universities have voted in favor of OA mandates clearly demonstrates 
the appeal of freedom to open up our scholarship. Like the disciplinary 
standards we impose on ourselves, certain limitations on academic freedom 
(in the negative sense) are justifiable on the grounds that the limits are self-
imposed. The notion of giving oneself limits, in other words, is compatible 
with a notion of positive academic freedom (which might better be termed 
autonomy).
The fourth lesson to be learned from OA mandates is that this notion 
of positive academic freedom is best addressed on the level of disciplinary 
autonomy. Academics within a discipline defer to the standards of their 
own discipline, or they violate them at their own risk. Academics from 
different disciplines tend to defer to the standards of the other’s discipline, 
provided that the territories staked out by those disciplines do not overlap. 
That the faculty (in the form of the senate) voted to adopt an OA mandate 
may de jure mean that all disciplines must comply, but few of us scholars 
would dispute the rights of individual disciplines (such as history) to resist 
such mandates.
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Risk, Reputation, and Revaluation
That a positive notion of academic freedom (autonomy) is compatible 
with a negative notion of academic freedom (from external constraint) 
is not sufficient to secure the success of libraries as scholarly publishers. 
Most of us scholars have uncritically (and largely unconsciously) em-
braced the negative notion of academic freedom. As I have argued above, 
this negative notion of academic freedom presents a significant barrier 
to libraries venturing into the field of scholarly publishing. If a library 
wishes to venture into the field of scholarly publishing, then what should 
it do?
If I am right in my preceding analysis, until we scholars adopt and 
pursue a notion of positive academic autonomy, there is a limit to what 
libraries can do. Pointing to freedom from the existing publishers may 
have some appeal to some of us scholars. But setting things up so that we 
have the freedom to publish through the library cannot succeed until we 
scholars recognize this (positive) freedom as worthy of pursuit.
As things stand now, any of us scholars who pursue publication outside 
the venues recognized by our disciplinary peers as exemplary are taking a 
risk. It is tempting to think that those of us who publish in “alternative” 
venues do so only at the expense of extra time. In other words, one might 
think that, as long as we publish the requisite amount (according to tenure 
and promotion requirements) in the recognized venues, we are also free 
to publish in alternative venues. The reality, however, is that in pursuing 
publication outside the accepted disciplinary norms, we run the risk of 
being misidentified, of being labeled a maverick at best or an outsider at 
worst. The safe advice for anyone seeking to pass through peer review is 
not to confuse the reviewers. Publications outside the norm, however, even 
accompanied by publications that fall well inside normal parameters, risk 
producing confusion. In publishing outside the recognized venues, we risk 
our scholarly reputations.
What we need is a revaluation of academic freedom that emphasizes 
positive liberty—the freedom to publish what we want where we want. 
Libraries as publishers could serve as a means to achieve that end. However, 
until we scholars realize, and recognize as a problem, that tenure—intended 
as the means to achieve academic freedom—has become the de facto end 
of scholarship, there is a large disincentive to pursue our freedom in a 
positive sense.
 We Scholars 53 
The barrier of tenure requirements is not one that libraries seeking to 
branch out into publishing can simply avoid. It will not be enough to build 
the capacity to publish and hope that we scholars will simply come and use 
it. Libraries, too, must take risks. Libraries must recognize that building 
tools and making them available is at most only part of what they must do. 
Resources are of no use unless they are actually used.
It is essential, then, that libraries engage their potential users as 
co-designers of their attempt to enter into scholarly publishing. This 
engagement must take place on multiple levels, including working with 
individual scholars to learn what design elements are essential and what 
would make their scholarship even better. But engagement must also take 
place on larger institutional levels, including those of the department, the 
university, and, ultimately, the disciplines. Although academic departments 
often hold sway within universities, disciplines are the seat of academic 
power. Only if disciplines see libraries-as-publishers as a means to the end 
of empowerment will libraries-as-publishers become viable in the eyes of 
us scholars.
Libraries-as-publishers are facing a crisis of legitimation. For this 
reason, it would make the most sense for libraries to partner with scholars 
from particular disciplines, as well as with disciplinary professional 
organizations, to develop publications designed specifically for those 
disciplines. It is essential to this design process that these publications be 
recognized by the disciplines as respectable venues. Peer review (one of 
the main trump cards held now by traditional scholarly publishers) should 
also be included as part of the design, whether the publications planned are 
journals or books.
The idea that libraries-as-publishers ought to engage disciplines 
suggests a course of action that runs counter to the discourse of replacing 
traditional scholarly publishers. The group of traditional scholarly 
publishers ought to be divided into two groups: for-profit publishers on 
the one hand and not-for-profit publishers on the other. The currently 
dominant narrative suggests that universities should be run more like 
businesses, which results in university presses, disciplinary professional 
organizations that rely on publication subscriptions, and libraries thinking 
in terms of “business models” for scholarly publication. A better way to 
approach the issue of scholarly publication, I have suggested, would be in 
terms of empowering scholars to pursue their scholarship with maximal 
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freedom and creativity. Speaking in such terms ought to appeal to not-
for-profit publishers, as well as to individual scholars, while falling on deaf 
ears of anyone seeking only profit from scholarship. Libraries that engage 
us scholars in such terms, rather than thinking only in terms of business 
models, stand a real chance of succeeding as scholarly publishers
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